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Editors’ note: The following essay won the prize for the best paper presented
by a graduate student at the annual meeting of the African Studies Associ-
ation in Washington, D.C., Fall 2005.
Abstract: This article develops a conceptual analysis of the dynamics of violence
during the transition from war to peace and democracy in the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo between 2003 and 2006. I locate the sources, at the local, national, and
regional levels, of continued local violence during this transition. Through an
analysis of the situation in the Kivus, I illustrate how local dynamics interacted with
the national and regional dimensions of the conflict. I demonstrate that, after a
national and regional settlement was reached, some local conflicts over land and
political power increasingly became self-sustaining and autonomous from the
national and regional tracks. 
Résumé: Dans cet article, je propose une analyse conceptuelle des mécanismes de
la violence durant les trois années officiellement consacrées à la transition de la
guerre à la paix et à la démocratie en République Démocratique du Congo (de
2003 à 2006) . J’identifie, au niveau local, national et régional, les raisons pour
lesquelles la violence a perduré localement au cours de cette période. J’analyse la
situation dans les Kivus pour illustrer l’interaction entre les mécanismes de la vio-
lence situés à ces différents niveaux. Je démontre que, après la signature d’accords
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de paix nationaux et régionaux, certains conflits locaux portant sur les terres et le
pouvoir politique se sont progressivement dissociés des processus nationaux et
régionaux et sont devenus autonomes. 
Introduction
A year after the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo officially ended
on June 30, 2003, more than one thousand civilians continued to die every
day. Most of the deaths were caused by disease and malnutrition and could
have been prevented if outbursts of violence had not impeded access to
humanitarian aid, especially in the east (International Rescue Committee
2004). In April 2004, for example, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs wrote the following situation report:
The security situation was the most worrying this month in North-Kivu,
South-Kivu and Katanga Provinces in the Eastern region of the Democra-
tic Republic of Congo. . . . As a consequence of the fighting and increased
tension in these three regions, approximately 30–35,000 people were esti-
mated displaced over the course of this month. In addition to the dis-
placement, [the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs] continued to receive reports of massacres, cannibalism, rapes,
looting, extortion and other serious violations of human rights being com-
mitted by various armed groups, leaving questions as to whether or not the
protection situation for civilians living in [the Congo] has improved since
the war officially ended last year. 
Even though the situation improved somewhat in 2005 and 2006, similar
reports of tensions and local hostilities could be found in all weekly and
monthly U.N. humanitarian situation reports covering the Congolese tran-
sition from war to peace and democracy (June 2003–December 2006).
What were the reasons for the continued violence during the transition? 
In June 2003, a settlement seemed to have been reached at the inter-
national and national levels. The foreign troops that withdrew from the
Congo in 2002 and 2003 officially remained out of Congolese territory.
Normal diplomatic ties, including the exchange of ambassadors, resumed
between former enemies. Important developments also took place at the
national level, such as the official reunification of the country, the forma-
tion of a unified government, the preparation for democratic elections,
and a progressive integration of the different armed groups into a single
national army. 
However, local conflict—at the level of the village, the district, or the
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community—persisted in the eastern Congo. Political, economic, and
social antagonisms generated frequent massacres, massive human rights
violations, and population displacement. Throughout the transition from
war to peace, the ongoing violence maintained the overall atmosphere of
terror of the war period. 
Local agendas have been a source of conflict and violence throughout
modern Congolese history. Local antagonisms over land and traditional
power led to violence long before the warfare of the 1990s. Most of these
conflicts involved only a few villages, communities, or provincial leaders. In
the case of the conflict between the Rwandophone minority and the
“indigenous” communities, however, local actors engaged national and
regional politicians in their fight from the 1960s onward.1 These local ten-
sions, combined with the retreat of the Congolese state, the ruling strategy
of Mobutu which enhanced local antagonisms, and the arrival of thousands
of Rwandan Hutus after the 1994 genocide, precipitated two wars in the
late 1990s. 
During this period of warfare, local political, economic, and social
agendas contributed to the widespread and horrific violence. These local
dynamics interacted with national and regional causes of violence and pro-
vided the pretext for the national and regional fighting that took place
throughout the eastern Congo. At the same time, national and regional
cleavages reinforced local tensions. Then, at the end of this time, both pre-
existing and war-induced local cleavages fueled ongoing local violence in
the east.2 Although some progress was made compared to the situation
during the war, many areas of the eastern Congo remained very unsafe, and
many Congolese continued to suffer from violence waged by one of the
many armed groups still active. 
Many of the international actors I interviewed, especially high-ranking
diplomats and U.N. staff members, do not believe that local causes played
a decisive role in sustaining national and regional violence during the war
and in the postwar period. During the transition, diplomats, U.N. staff, and
many nongovernmental organizations worked mostly on the national and
regional cleavages, mediating among, and when necessary putting pressure
on, the main Congolese, Rwandan, and Ugandan political and military
leaders. Their role at the local level was often nonexistent (Autesserre
2006). 
I claim that local dynamics remained key after the war formally ended.
In making my case, I proceed as follows. First, I present my analytical
framework. Second, I locate the sources at the local, national, and regional
levels of continued local violence during the transition. I emphasize the
importance and distinctiveness of local agendas in the Congo as well as the
local dimension of problems usually considered as purely national and
regional (i.e., the status of the Rwandophone minority and the presence of
the rebel Rwandan Hutu militias). Third, I provide a brief overview of the
situation in North and South Kivu. I document how the interlocking nature
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of these tensions caused violence to spread from one level to the other. I
illuminate how the dynamics of this interconnection created economic and
political opportunities for individual and group actors, who then had an
interest in ensuring that violence continued—even if they dissimulated and
provided rhetorical assurances to the contrary. I also demonstrate that,
after a national and regional settlement was reached, some local conflicts
over land, political power, and ethnic antagonism increasingly became self-
sustaining and autonomous from the national and regional tracks. 
I focus on three of the four most violent areas of the Congo during the
transition: the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, and North Katanga. I
do not include in my analysis the Ituri district because the patterns of vio-
lence there were very different from the dynamics of violence in the other
areas. I draw on field observations in Kinshasa and the provinces of
Katanga and the Kivus conducted between 2001 and 2006; document
analysis; and more than 280 interviews conducted with Congolese political,
military, diplomatic, and civil society actors, victims of violence, diplomats,
staff of international organizations, and foreign observers—in the Congo,
France, Belgium, New York, and Washington, D.C. Given the substantial
degree of political tension and uncertainty surrounding the themes of this
article, and given the culture of secrecy pervasive in U.N. and diplomatic
circles, most of the people I interviewed preferred to remain anonymous.
For this reason, I reference only the data obtained through on-record
interviews or in public sources. Unless otherwise indicated, the rest of the
information presented in this article comes from the author’s anonymous
interviews, and each observation has been confirmed by at least five differ-
ent sources.
Analytical Framework
The paucity of research on the impact of local violence on the viability of
peace processes constitutes a significant gap in the scholarly literature on
conflict resolution. How can we analyze the dynamics of violence—partic-
ularly at the local level—during the Congolese transition? Is localized vio-
lence merely a manifestation of national and regional tensions or is it dis-
tinctive in character? If the latter, how does local violence interface with
violence at the national and regional levels? Are local agendas indepen-
dent of and autonomous from, or connected to and dependent on,
national and regional motivations? 
Academics and practitioners often share the same flawed interpreta-
tion of conflict (Kalyvas 2003). Most analysts perceive local dynamics “as a
mere (and rather irrelevant) local manifestation of the central cleavage”
and local actors as mere “replicas of central actors” (Kalyvas 2003:481). In
his comparative analysis of civil wars, Kalyvas (2003:482) emphasizes
instead “the presence of considerable local input and initiative in the pro-
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duction of violence. Rather than being imposed upon communities by out-
siders . . . , violence often (but not always) grows from within communities
even when it is executed by outsiders” (see also Kalyvas 2006).
To illuminate the multiple layers and connections among conflicts at
different levels, I build on Kalyvas’s analysis that local and national dimen-
sions of violence interact through two distinct mechanisms: cleavage and
alliance. “Cleavage” refers to the “overarching issue dimension”—that is,
ideology, ethnicity, religion, or class—which links actors at the center to
actors on the ground (Kalyvas 2003:476). “Alliance” is a concept that links
the central actors’ quest for national power to the local actors’ quest for
local advantages. It “entails a transaction between supralocal and local
actors, whereby the former supply the latter with external muscle, thus
allowing them to win decisive local advantage; in exchange the former rely
on local conflicts to recruit and motivate supporters and obtain local con-
trol, resources, and information” (Kalyvas 2003:486). 
Although I agree with Kalyvas’s insight, I find it necessary to modify his
analytical framework in order to account adequately for the dynamics of
violence during the Congolese transition. First, Kalyvas’s analysis includes
only the local and national dimensions. He misses the international dimen-
sion that is so often present in civil wars, such as the involvement of Liberia
in Sierra Leone, Pakistan and Iran in Afghanistan, the United States in
Columbia, and Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola, and Zimbabwe in the
Congo. Instead of using Kalyvas’s binary framework (local-national), I use
a three-tiered framework (local-national-regional), in which the local can
be further subdivided into several different levels: the individual, the fam-
ily, the clan, the municipality, the community, the district, the ethnic
group, and the province. 
Second, Kalyvas tends to conceptualize the local dimension as the com-
plete opposite of the national dimension. To him, the master cleavages
stem from political, ideological, ethnic, or economic issues. Although he
mentions the political and social aspects of local factionalism
(2006:365–74), in most of his analyses the local dimension operates at a
level that does not extend beyond the strictly local. In his study of denun-
ciation, for example, the local conflicts often evolve from the realm of the
private: personal grudges, professional jealousy, family feuds, romantic
rivalries, individual fights (2006:346–52). I argue, however, that although
local conflict operates on a scale that is different from that of national and
international conflict, it is not necessarily of a different nature: local con-
flict is also rooted in political, ideological, ethnic, economic, or social
antagonisms among groups; it is not essentially private. 
Third, Kalyvas hypothesizes that top-down mechanisms (cleavages) are
likely to do “most of the ‘heavy lifting’ before the war, during its initial
stages, or after the war has ended,” while the bottom-up mechanism
(alliance) may prevail when the war is under way (Kalyvas 2003:487). I
demonstrate that alliances can also prevail during the postconflict period. 
Local Violence, National Peace? 5
Identifying the Different Loci of Violence during the
Transition: Regional, National, and Local Patterns 
Regional Causes of Local Violence
In March 2005, the U.N. Security Council denounced Rwanda’s and
Uganda’s continuing involvement in supporting the armed groups respon-
sible, among other things, for the perpetuation of violence in the Congo.
In particular, Rwanda remained physically present in the Kivus, and in 2004
it often carried out hit-and-run operations in the border regions
(Romkema 2004). Rwandan troops often crossed the border to patrol areas
of North and South Kivu; the Rwandan Army maintained “semi-fixed posi-
tions” in North Kivu (U.N. Security Council 2004); and the U.N. Mission in
the Congo (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo, or
MONUC) denounced the presence of Rwandese soldiers there in March
2004 (interview with MONUC official, 2005; informal communication with
foreign observer, 2004; Institute for Security Studies 2004). Many witnesses
have claimed that in November 2004 Rwandan army trucks had crossed
into the Congo; although MONUC never confirmed the presence of Rwan-
dan troops there, evidence of an invasion was sufficient for the United
Kingdom and Sweden to suspend substantial quantities of aid to Rwanda
(Global Witness 2005; International Crisis Group 2005:21–22; author’s
interviews, spring 2005; review of press articles).
Three important incentives were at the root of the Rwandan involve-
ment in the Congo during the transition: first, the threat posed by the con-
tinued presence of Rwandan Hutu militias; second, the problem of ethnic
hatred against Congolese Rwandophones; and third, the appeal of the
Kivus’ mineral resources. 
During the transition, armed groups affiliated with the Democratic
Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces Démocratique pour la Libéra-
tion du Rwanda, or FDLR) remained heavily present in both Kivus.3 They
included combatants as well as family members of the combatants,
refugees, and political opponents forced to flee by Kagame’s crackdown on
opposition parties. Congolese and international observers often labeled
these people—combatants as well as noncombatants—as “Interahamwés,”
while the Rwandan government insisted that they were mostly “former
génocidaires.” However, many well-informed interviewees confirmed that
only a small number of those responsible for the 1994 genocide were in the
Congo. Most of the FDLR were people who had arrived in the Congo when
they were young, had grown up there as refugees, and used violence
because they had no other means of subsistence. 
The Rwandan government often complained about this continued
FDLR presence in the Congo and emphasized the threat it posed to its
country. Kigali, therefore, threatened several times—notably in November
2004 and in April 2005—to invade the Congo again should Congolese and
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international actors fail to solve the FDLR problem. However, the relatively
small group of FDLR combatants remaining in the Congolese forests did
not seem to pose a real danger to Rwanda (author’s interviews with foreign
political and military observers and with peace builders working with the
FDLR, 2004–6). Contrary to Kagame’s propaganda, there had been no
attacks, only a few infiltrations since the last major FDLR assault on Rwanda
in spring 2001. The danger posed by FDLR troops further decreased after
the 2005 Sant’Egidio negotiations forced the FDLR leadership to officially
renounce the armed struggle. 
Many Congolese and international observers wondered, therefore,
whether Kagame’s assertions that he was worried by the FDLR presence in
the Congo were perhaps “all an act, or a pretext.”4 They emphasized that,
contrary to these claims, Kagame apparently did not want Hutu militias to
be repatriated. First, “not even a single combatant came back when the
Rwandans were in the Congo.” Second, Kagame and his ally, the Congolese
Rally for Democracy-Goma (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocra-
tie-Goma, or RCD-G), presented many obstacles to the U.N. program that
was organizing the pacific repatriation of the FDLR.5 Thus many intervie-
wees claimed that Kagame knew that the FDLR was not a real threat to
Rwanda, but that he had several reasons to prefer either its extermination
or continued roaming in the Congo. Keeping the FDLR out of Rwanda
ensured that the movement could not become an official, recognized
opposition to the Rwandan ruling party. Keeping the FDLR in the Congo
also allowed Kagame to maintain a permanent quasi-state of war in Rwanda
and therefore to restrict civil rights and clamp down on opposition parties.
Finally, according to many interviewees, the FDLR presence in the Congo
provided Kigali with a pretext for coming back into the Kivus and pursuing
what Rwanda was truly interested in: protecting the Rwandophones and
exploiting the Congo’s resources. 
During the transition, the members of the Rwandophone community
of the Congo were subject to considerable discrimination and abuse, and
many Congolese groups contested their very right to live on Congolese ter-
ritory. This hatred fed Rwanda’s alleged concerns for a potental “genocide”
of Rwandophone communities. Several times during the transition—
notably after the May–June 2004 fighting in Bukavu and the August 2004
massacre in Gatumba—Rwanda threatened to go back into the Congo if
Kabila did not take appropriate measures to protect the Rwandophone
minority and stop the anti-Rwandophone propaganda. The Congolese felt
deep resentment toward Rwanda because of its lengthy occupation of the
eastern Congo; thus these threats reinforced the anti-Rwandophone feel-
ings among the vast majority of the Congolese people and led to further
discrimination and violence against Rwandophones.
Economic motivations also seemed largely to account for Rwanda’s
interest in the eastern Congo. U.N. and nongovernmental organizations
noted the discrepancies between the very limited mining resources of
Local Violence, National Peace? 7
Uganda and Rwanda, and their massive exports of cassiterite, Coltan, tin,
and gold (Global Witness 2005:4, 24–26; Pourtier 2004:4; U.N. Security
Council 2005b: par 85–86). Global Witness’s (2005) case study on cassi-
terite documented how the Rwandan state was involved in this illegal traf-
ficking: first as the prime beneficiary (the state-owned company Redemi
being the major exporter of tin and cassiterite); and second as an armed
actor able to secure mining sites when necessary. In addition, Rwandan offi-
cials and civilians also benefited from the trafficking because of the “impor-
tant business links” they had developed with members of the RCD-G
(Global Witness 2005:26). In the words of a MONUC spokesperson, “the
economic dimension of the pillage of natural resources, with Rwanda and
Uganda profiting especially, continues to be the key to their [involve-
ment].”6 This involvement was sporadic and aimed at influencing or super-
vising Congolese allies. The six-year conflict had enabled foreign countries
to set up systems of exploitation that could continue functioning through
Congolese proxies even after the Rwandan or Ugandan armies had with-
drawn. 
The combination of these security, political, and economic interests
led Rwanda to actively support several armed groups responsible for local
violence in the eastern Congo. At the end of 2003, Rwanda resumed mili-
tary support to several Kivu militias (International Crisis Group 2004). Fur-
thermore, Rwandan officials supported Kunda and Mutebusi during the
2004 conflict in Bukavu. They provided the renegade leaders with heavy
arms and ammunition, uniforms, money, and a rear base in Rwanda to
regroup and retreat when necessary, and helped them recruit soldiers
(U.N. Security Council 2004). Rwanda also helped the North Kivu gover-
nor, Eugene Seruphuli (a Rwandophone affiliated with the RCD-G), arm
Rwandophone civilians in Masisi and constitute additional local defense
militias (Amnesty International 2005).
National Causes of Local Violence
If regional agendas continued to cause violence during the transition,
national dimensions remained similarly influential. Two series of causes for
local violence can be identified at the national level: first, political and mil-
itary issues (including a high distrust among participants in the Transi-
tional Government, which was deepened by the slow pace of the transition,
the personal ambitions of the national spoilers, and the hatred of Rwan-
dophones); and second, economic issues. 
Throughout the transition, the Transitional Government was mostly
characterized by a distrust among the representatives of the different “com-
ponents” of the transition institutions. These were the eight most powerful
political or military groups at the outset of the civil war, and they had
received an equal share of representation in the government, the parlia-
ment, and the national administration. The government did not work as a
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team to manage the transition and lead the country, but rather as enemy
factions bent on overtaking one another and on enhancing the political,
military, symbolic, and financial position of their own parties. The internal
antagonisms were such that the government stopped functioning as an
entity during the third year of the transition. 
The political and military unification at the top level (government and
General Staff) was a smokescreen. It masked the fact that each component
retained parallel military and administrative structures in order to main-
tain its territorial control to the furthest extent possible (Romkema 2004).
In the administration, the strategic departments—police, security services,
taxes, and so on—largely continued to operate along party lines all
throughout the transition, although some technical departments—such as
health, social affairs, and education—started functioning under the
national authority in late 2003. Militarily, each component strived to main-
tain control over its former military assets under the umbrella of the newly
unified army, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
(Forces Armées de la République Democratique du Congo, or FARDC). 
This continuation of high-level hostilities created dire local conse-
quences. In the eastern provinces, the antagonisms between the RCD-G
and Kabila fueled the resistance of all former warring parties to the army
integration process. The persistent distrust and lack of integration gener-
ated a highly volatile situation in those territories that continued to be con-
trolled by troops affiliated with different factions, and led to both small-
scale battles and several bouts of large-scale fighting.7
The local population was the first to suffer from this fighting. Each
armed group used violence to deter villagers from supporting some other
armed group. Prime examples were the actions of the RCD-G aimed at pre-
venting villagers from collaborating with the Mai Mai in Rutchuru or with
FDLR around Kayna; actions of the Mai Mai to prevent villagers from col-
laborating with the FARDC in Malemba-Nkulu; and actions of FDLR in
Walungu to punish villagers for helping the FARDC in summer 2005
(author’s interviews and review of press articles, 2003–6).8 The Bukavu cri-
sis also illustrated the Congolese armed groups’ tendency to flee from their
assailants; then, when the assailants had left or the groups had retaken a
given city, they would take revenge on the population (see especially
Human Rights Watch 2004). 
The slow pace of the transition deepened the distrust among the par-
ticipants in the Transitional Government and among different armed
groups, and reinforced the negative consequences of this suspicion on the
ground. Two main factors accounted for the transition’s lack of progress:
first, the above-mentioned struggle within the Transitional Government,
which blocked the decision-making process; and second, the interests that
most representatives had in stalling the transition process. 
The Sun City and Pretoria peace agreements privileged a repartition of
power between former warring parties, notwithstanding their lack of legit-
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imacy in the eyes of the population. After the general elections scheduled
for the end of the transition, only the allies of the winning party—which
everybody expected to be President Kabila’s—would be able to retain their
positions of authority. For prominent leaders investigated by the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, such as Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba, a longer
transition meant continued immunity from prosecution. For the many gov-
ernment workers (at the top and at the bottom of the hierarchy) who were
utterly incompetent and owed their nominations to their affiliation with
one of the components, a long transition meant more time to enrich their
coffers.9
One of the consequences of the slow pace of the transition was the con-
tinued absence of state authority in the east, especially in the rural areas.
The eastern provinces had experienced a progressive retreat of state
authority under Mobutu and a complete collapse of the state during the
war. During the transition, the lack of state presence in the eastern Congo
continued to be such that, in February 2005, the Belgian foreign minister
found it appropriate to call the Congo a “failed state.” In the absence of
state authority, the justice and police forces acted with impunity. Bias, cor-
ruption, and inefficiency were so widespread that these sectors lost all cred-
ibility with the Congolese people. At the same time, the lack of legitimate
state authority in the east encouraged the continuation of violence, which
seemed the easiest road to power and wealth. Thus civil as well as violent
crime (including rape and kidnapping) persisted in many areas, unhin-
dered by the nonfunctioning forces of law and order. 
The conditions of impunity and the lack of legitimate state authority in
the east also facilitated the illegal exploitation of resources. During the
transition, the FDLR, Mai Mai, RCD-G, pro-Ugandan, pro-Rwandan, and
criminal groups remained involved in illegal mining (Global Witness 2005;
International Crisis Group 2005; Romkema 2004; U.N. Security Council
2005a, 2005b). Large quantities of cassiterite, Coltan, gold, diamonds, and
palm nut crossed the borders every day and evaded the tax authorities. This
situation, in turn, fueled the absence of state authority in the east: first, by
reinforcing the reluctance of many local strongmen to work in good faith
with the central authorities; and second, by depriving the Transitional Gov-
ernment of important resources that could have helped it extend its
authority (informal communication, Congolese observer, June 2004; see
also U.N. Security Council 2005e: par. 44; 73).
In addition to those representatives stalling the transition for political
or individual reasons—and thus indirectly contributing to continued con-
flict—there were a few influential groups that used violence to end the
peace process. The three main former warring parties—RCD-G, Congo
Liberation Movement, and the Kabila government—were split between two
sides: the legitimists, who wanted to play the game of the transition, and
the warmongers, who either had everything to lose with the peace or had
too much to gain from war to accept a settlement of the conflict. Two of
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these groups could be held responsible for major outbreaks of violence in
the east. RCD-G extremists triggered the Kunda-Mutebusi offensive on
Bukavu (May 2004), the tensions in Masisi following North Kivu Governor
Seruphuli’s distribution of arms to local Hutus (Fall 2004), the Kanyabay-
onga crisis (December 2004), and the Rutchuru crisis (February 2006).
The “Katangans” (that is, Kabila’s former closest advisors, mostly ethnic
Lubas from Katanga) sparked the February 2004 fighting between Mute-
busi and Nabyola troops in Bukavu (Romkema 2004), reportedly encour-
aged Major Lengwe to attempt a coup d’état on the night of June 10–11,
2004 (International Crisis Group 2004), and engineered the ousting of for-
mer RCD soldiers, an act that precipitated the Kanyabayonga crisis.
If the personal ambitions of the national spoilers led to several clashes
among different armed groups stationed in the east, hatred against Rwan-
dophones was a much more pervasive source of violence. In Kinshasa,
newspapers every day disparaged the Rwandophone community and their
political party, the RCD-G: both were presented as the source of the war
and of all the problems in the transition, and they were depicted as the
“Trojan horse” of the abhorred Rwandese. Leaders from all side of the
political spectrum defended a similar point of view, apparently for the sake
of electoral advantage. Fueling ethnic hatred spared politicians the need to
develop real political platforms. Rwandophone-bashing was an easy way to
show one’s patriotism and to appeal to the majority of the Congolese pop-
ulation. This led to a vicious circle: existing ethnic tensions encouraged
national politicians to use anti-Rwandophone rhetoric, which further
stirred ethnic hatred, which was an important cause of local violence in the
eastern Congo. 
Not only political issues, but also national economic agendas fueled
tensions and violence in the east during the transition. The fight between
Kinshasa- and Goma-based companies over trade in the eastern provinces
both exploited and reinforced anti-Rwandophone feelings. In addition,
national actors were often involved in the illegal exploitation of natural
resources in the east. The RCD-G troops and administrative officials
secured, taxed, and supervised the exploitation and transportation to
Rwanda of the mining resources in their area of control (Global Witness
2005: 4, 16). Upon their arrival in the Kivu, numbers of FARDC brigades
also became involved in mining: soldiers either dug minerals or taxed the
local production, while the officers facilitated and benefited from the ille-
gal exportation of minerals—notably cassiterite—to Uganda, Tanzania, or
Rwanda (Global Witness 2005:17–20). 
The national involvement in illegal mining generated local violence in
three different ways. First, national actors competed among themselves as
well as with local and foreign armed groups (notably Mai Mai and FDLR)
for the control of mining sites. This led to frequent fighting over the key
mining areas of the Kivus (Global Witness 2005:4, 8, 16). Second, illicit
exploitation of resources enabled all armed groups to finance their war
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efforts, which further fueled armed conflict (Staibano 2005:3; U.N. Secu-
rity Council 2005c). Third, control of mining sites by national or local
armed groups caused massive violence against the local population. Global
Witness (2005:10) documents that in the mining areas of North and South
Kivu, “violations against international human rights and humanitarian law
were colossal. . . . Abuses on the part of government soldiers and other
armed combatants targeted non-combatants and included killing, rape,
torture, arbitrary arrests, intimidation, mutilation, the destruction or pil-
lage of private property. . . [and] mass displacement.” The report goes on
to show that all armed groups were involved in such violence against civil-
ians and that these abuses were “integrally linked to natural resources, par-
ticularly in the eastern provinces, as they were employed as methods by
which to gain control either over resource-rich areas or over the ability to
[exploit them].” 
Finally, diversion of funds for the army reinforced the soldiers’ ten-
dency to prey on the population. Not only was the soldiers’ pay far too low
to cover their basic needs, but it was also widely acknowledged that between
20 and 40 percent of it was embezzled. Furthermore, officials in Kinshasa
and in the provinces diverted the funds for the integration of the army. The
consequence was that the soldiers’ commanders, who did not have the
resources to remunerate their troops adequately or provide them with
basic supplies, encouraged them to make a living from the local popula-
tion. A commander at the highest level acknowledged that military author-
ities had advised soldiers to “sort it out” (“se débrouiller”), which in the
Congolese context meant helping oneself to the local population’s assets
(humanitarian worker, 2004). 
Thus all soldiers (belonging to all components) continued to harass
the local population throughout the transition. This meant extorting the
local residents, stealing all kinds of valuables in urban areas (money,
mobile phones) and harvests or cattle in rural areas, and beating, raping,
torturing, killing, or imprisoning those who refused to comply (author’s
interviews with Congolese inhabitants of urban and rural areas, 2004–6).
Abuses by soldiers trying to make a living were so widely reported that they
seemed to be the most common form of low-level violence in the east. Of
course, because local commanders either participated in these abuses or
encouraged their troops to do so, appealing for justice within the military
hierarchy never solved anything. 
Local Causes of Violence
If regional and national antagonism continued to generate high levels of
violence at the local level, local conflict was also motivated by distinctly
local causes. The main difference between the war period and the transi-
tion was that during the transition these local agendas became increasingly
autonomous from the national and regional tracks. 
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During the transition, in the words of a conflict-resolution worker
based in South Kivu (Romkema 2004b), “the environment at the grassroots
level was very favorable to a rebellion” because the Congolese “were very
divided.” In the east, the problem was not only “the most obvious division,
‘everybody against the Banyamulenges,’” but also the “hundreds of poten-
tial divisions, of local problems,” which were exploited by commanders and
often erupted in violence. In North Kivu, South Kivu, and North Katanga,
a mosaic of alliances and counteralliances separated the numerous ethnic
groups in each province. The clan and ethnic tensions were usually articu-
lated in terms of social, economic, and political issues. Clanic, ethnic, polit-
ical, and social identities remained extremely fluid during the transition
and individuals often switched allegiance from one group to another as
opportunities arose. The causes of the divisions were intertwined both with
one another and with national and regional agendas. 
Lack of social opportunities during the war had led many young Con-
golese to turn to militias as the only source of social mobility (Van Acker &
Vlassenroot 2000:25). These social motivations persisted after the war. A
Western donor, for example (interviewed in 2005), claimed that the Mai
Mai remained “very hungry for some respect and some identity.” Just as
during the war, involvement in a militia gave its members the feeling of
“[being] part of a thing, attached to a group,” and of being “recognized as
something separate from the masses.” Individuals and groups—such as the
youth and the pygmies—who, because of the war, had attained a status that
was previously denied to them, had therefore strong incentives to perpetu-
ate the violent situation that had enabled them to reach a higher social
position.10 Similarly, many Mai Mai chiefs knew that, should peace return
to the Congo, they would lose their status as all-powerful, kinglike leaders
and become once again mere soldiers—often ill-trained and illiterate
(author’s interviews and informal communications, 2004–6). This was one
of their main motivations for refusing to be integrated into the army (inter-
view, Jean-Charles Dupin, humanitarian advisor, U.N. Office for the Coor-
dination of Humanitarian Affairs, Bukavu, April 2005). 
The second social cause of local violence was the threat of retaliation
against those perceived as having wronged their neighbors or their com-
munities during the war. This threat remained mostly latent throughout
the transition period, but according to a humanitarian worker (Dupin
2005), it was one of the main problems that the return of refugees from
Tanzania was likely to raise. It was also the main reason why, two years after
the beginning of the transition, many refugees and displaced persons had
failed to return to their home villages in the Kivus and North Katanga.
They were “afraid of being accused of having supported someone, or taken
this or that point of view, or afraid that the mere fact that they had fled was
a sign that they had a bad conscience” (interview, Anders Vatn, head of mis-
sion, Norwegian Refugee Council, Goma, March 2005).
In addition to social issues, political antagonisms at the local level
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fueled significant violence. Conflicts of succession continued to generate
tensions similar to those that had existed before and during the war. Dur-
ing the transition, these were further complicated by the competition
between new and traditional authorities. During the war, many traditional
authorities (village, collectivity, or territory chiefs) had fled, either to
escape ongoing violence or because an armed group (Mai Mai militias or
RCD-G affiliates) had usurped their power. After the war, the return of the
traditional authorities to their territories generated a high level of hostility.
In the Osso and Bashali collectivities (North Kivu), the Hunde population
reportedly sided with the newly returned traditional chief, himself a
Hunde, against the Hutu chiefs who had seized power during the war; in
retaliation the Hutu chiefs committed “a lot of abuses” against the sup-
porters of their opponents (interview, Azile Tanzi, head of mission, Cam-
pagne Pour la Paix, Goma, April 2005). Because Hutus dominated the
army stationed in the area, the Hundes could not express their dissatisfac-
tion for fear of retaliation from the military apparatus. However, it was clear
that, should the composition of the army change and become less pro-
Hutu, the Hundes would very soon take revenge on their Hutu neighbors. 
Such conflicts between new and traditional authorities were not lim-
ited to North Kivu. One of the main problems linked to the repatriation of
refugees from Tanzania to South Kivu was the tension likely to arise with
the return of traditional authorities to their area of origin (Dupin 2005).
Similarly, while conducting interviews in a camp for displaced people in
Nyunzu (North Katanga), I realized that, contrary to my expectations, peo-
ple in the camps were not the lowest-ranking members of their communi-
ties but rather families of local traditional authorities (notably village and
collectivity chiefs). Ordinary citizens had been allowed to go back to their
villages, but when the chiefs tried to do so, the Mai Mai soldiers who had
taken their place threatened them and forced them to leave again. Articles
in the press suggested that this situation was common throughout Katanga.
For example, Reuters reported that in the Mitwaba territory, “local admin-
istrators described [the Mai Mai] as a collection of bandits, poachers and
gunmen trying to usurp the power of the local chiefs.”11
In addition to local conflict over traditional power, there was ethnic
conflict over appointments in state institutions by transitional authorities.
For example, in the Shabunda territory (South Kivu) in 2004, the Mai Mai
General Padiri (himself a Tembo), who was recognized as a leading figure
in the Mai Mai movement by the transitional authorities, reportedly
appointed only Mai-Mai Tembo to important military and administrative
positions. This led to several small-scale fights between the Mai-Mai Tembo
and the Mai-Mai Rega, until the Mai-Mai Rega retaliated by chasing the Mai
Mai-Tembo from Shabunda territory (interview, humanitarian worker,
2005). In most cases, such political tensions interfaced with economically
motivated hostilities. Political power often guarantees access to land and
economic resources, while access to wealth means, in turn, the availability
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of resources to buy arms and reward troops and to secure political power.
In particular, the land problems that had led to massive local violence
before and during the war remained salient in the eastern Congo and
often constituted the grassroots dimension of local conflicts (MONUC
2004).12 
In South Kivu, land issues were usually the most important source of
conflict in rural areas (humanitarian workers, 2006) and further problems
were expected with the return of refugees (interview with Prof. Mugangu,
Bukavu, July 26, 2006). In North Kivu, land problems were “the main
source of local conflicts” in Masisi (Vatn 2005) and an important source of
tension between RCD-G and Mai Mai groups stationed in Walikale in early
2004 (informal communication, humanitarian aid worker, June 2004). In
North Katanga, the Bembes reportedly attempted to take over land in
Holoholo and Kalanga areas. Local tensions over land sometimes erupted
into open fighting, such as in Walikale (North Kivu) in June 2004,
Bwerema (South Kivu) in December 2004, and Katogota (South Kivu) in
November 2005 (International Crisis Group 2005:14; author’s interviews
and review of press articles, 2004–6). They also greatly impeded the peace-
ful return of refugees and displaced persons because those in control of
the land after the war threatened to use force to avoid giving it up.
Competition for the control of natural resources also remained a
major cause of local conflict in the Kivus and North Katanga. In 2005, the
U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs claimed that the
control of mineral resources was becoming the driving force of the Mai Mai
phenomenon. In North Katanga, most of the Mai Mai chiefs had
regrouped around the gold mines and were striving to control them. In
Nyunzu, for example, violence took place mostly around the gold mines of
the northern part of the territory. All of the armed groups based in the
Kivus also used violence to access the mining resources of the provinces.
For example, in Shabunda (South Kivu), the vice president of the
Shabunda section of the Civil Society reported that “the armed forces” pit-
ted against each other the persons who had legal claims on mineral-rich
areas (interview, Buka Pole Pole, Shabunda, April 2005). When the ten-
sions reached an alarming level and erupted in localized violence, armed
forces usually intervened to disarm people and confiscate their exploita-
tion rights. Then the armed forces would either exploit the concessions
themselves or hand them over to a third party. Provincial and national com-
manders were reportedly bribed into looking the other way.
Finally, the need to find means of survival, which had pushed many
civilians to enroll in militias during the war (Van Acker & Vlassenroot
2000), remained salient during the transition. Before the war, most of the
Congolese population had faced massive poverty and unemployment. In
the east, this situation deteriorated further during the war. Children and
teenagers who had grown up during the war had not received proper
schooling and thus were not well-prepared for pursuing peaceful and pro-
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ductive activities. Land remained scarce, so young people could not easily
acquire fields for farming, and the economic and development infrastruc-
ture was nonexistent. Outside intervention in the east continued to focus
on humanitarian issues, and very few development projects were funded in
the eastern provinces. In this context, being part of a militia remained the
most profitable option. The continuing insecurity enabled Mai Mai militia-
men to set up checkpoints and demand “tolls” from anyone who came
through, and to make money “through looting, rackets, and blackmail.”13
Local Dimensions of the FDLR Problem 
These economic and political issues often motivated local alliances with the
FDLR. Given the number of atrocities for which the FDLR is responsible,
its leaders’ claims that their troops were often well integrated in the Kivus
may have sounded like mere propaganda. However, the FDLR did benefit
from the support of many local strongmen. The Mai Mai, their allies of the
war period, often continued to collaborate with them in both Kivus during
the transition. For example, in Fizzi, Mai Mai leaders reportedly hid FDLR
combatants (interview, Congolese civilian, South Kivu, May 2004). In
Walungu, some groups like the Rasta included both FDLR and Mai Mai sol-
diers. In Lemera (a Mai Mai–controlled zone near Uvira) on market day,
one had to go through both Mai Mai and FDLR checkpoints before reach-
ing the market itself, which reportedly swarmed with armed FDLR com-
batants (informal communications, humanitarian workers, 2005–6). In
North Kivu, the FDLR reportedly collaborated with some Mai Mai groups,
which enlisted them in their factional fighting against other Mai Mai
groups. 
During the transition, the FDLR even enrolled new allies: FARDC sol-
diers originally from Bemba’s or Kabila’s forces. A U.N. official working
with the FDLR (interviewed in 2005) reported that these Congolese sol-
diers were “afraid of the FDLR” and therefore refused to attack them.
Because they also were not paid and were poorly disciplined, they were eas-
ily bribed by the FDLR into assisting them in taxing and looting the Con-
golese population. In Shabunda territory, for example, the FDLR (based in
the northern part of the territory, near Kalolo) were reportedly on very
good terms with the FARDC brigades that were supposed to prevent them
from raiding the local population. FDLR families peacefully cultivated
their fields and regularly sold their products to the local market. Similar sit-
uations existed in the South Kivu territories of Kilembwe and Lemera
(informal communications, humanitarian workers, 2004–6).
In addition to armed forces, local administrative authorities in places
such as South Kivu and the Lubero and Walikale territories (North Kivu)
also collaborated with the FDLR.14 In these latter two areas, the authorities
of the RCD-Kisangani/Liberation Movement (RCD-K/ML) largely toler-
ated the presence of FDLR members, provided they refrained from raping
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and killing while they looted villages (humanitarian worker, 2005). In other
areas, notably in Walikale, Rutchuru, Lemera, and Kilembwe, Congolese
inhabitants reportedly accepted the FDLR living on their territory as long
as they refrained from harassment (author’s interviews, 2004–6; Willame,
personal communication based on a discussion with a MONUC official,
2005).
The presence of FDLR in the Congo, which usually has been presented
as a national or regional problem, was thus very much grounded in local
dynamics, which reinforced national and regional interaction. Local
alliances were key to perpetuating the FDLR presence on Congolese terri-
tory and the violence associated with it. To a high ranking R-FDLR official
(2005), Rwandan Hutu refugees “would not have been able to survive”
without the good relationships they had developed with the local popula-
tion. FDLR groups were too small and too divided internally; they could
not have remained on Congolese territory if they had been required to sur-
vive on their own while fighting back all Congolese military forces. On the
contrary, support by local armed groups enabled the Rwandan combatants
to recruit allies, to fight their opponents, and to hide from the FARDC
(usually RCD-G) and MONUC troops determined to attack them. That
local authorities tolerated the FDLR on mining territories also enabled the
Rwandan militias to find the economic resources they needed to buy arms
and continue fighting.15 Moreover, this local collaboration enhanced the
quality of life for the FDLR on Congolese territory and therefore dimin-
ished their incentives to peaceably return to Rwanda.16 Support by local
authorities, local forces, and sometimes local populations allowed FDLR
forces to live near Congolese villages. In selected places such as Rutchuru,
Shabunda, and Kilembwe, this enabled FDLR families to trade goods and
services with the surrounding population. In other places, it provided the
FDLR with the opportunity to live off the surrounding Congolese popula-
tion through looting. Kidnappings, rapes, tortures, and massacres accom-
panied their raids on Congolese villages.
Local Dimensions of the Rwandophone Issue 
Contrary to a commonly held belief, the problem of the Rwandophone
minority status, which had the potential of jeopardizing the regional and
national peace settlements, also carried distinctively local stakes. Before the
war, the Rwandophone problem was rooted in local conflicts around land
and traditional power (Mamdani 2001; Willame 1997). During the transi-
tion, Rwandophones’ claims on traditional political power—and their asso-
ciated claims on land—continued to fuel anti-Rwandophone sentiments
and to generate violence. Tensions were especially high in provinces where
the Rwandophones constituted the largest ethnic group, as in Masisi,
where they successfully managed to “prevent other groups from access-
ing . . . power” (Batahabi Bushoki, conference, City University of New York,
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May 19, 2005). In South Kivu, where Rwandophones were a minority in all
territories, their claim of entitlement to traditional representation also met
with large resistance. There, the reason was that during the war the RCD-
G had carved up a few territories such as Minembwe where Banyamulenges
were the majority and could therefore rule the area. During the transition
the Banyamulenges refused to abide by the requests of the “indigenous”
communities to return to the prewar territorial arrangements.
All throughout South Kivu, these political and economic motivations
were multiplied exponentially by the departure of Banyamulenges from
Uvira and Bukavu in June 2004, after fighting took place there between
Rwandophone and FARDC troops. Those who fled vacated the high posi-
tions and nice houses they had acquired during the war. “Indigenous” Con-
golese took over these jobs and houses, refused to restore them to the
Banyamulenges who returned in late 2004, and tried to discourage the
refugees from coming back and threatening their new wealth and author-
ity (Dupin 2005; interview, NGO official, South Kivu, spring 2005). Given
these local political and economic stakes, the return of the Banyamulenges
who had fled generated many incidents of violence in 2004 and 2005. The
most publicized one took place in September 2004 when, after 160 Banya-
mulenge refugees (mostly women and children) were massacred in a
refugee camp in Gatumba (Burundi), hundreds of Banyamulenge refugees
tried to return to the Congo from Burundi. They were blocked at the bor-
der for several days and obliged to stay in the “neutral zone” between the
two countries. The first group that succeeded in reentering the Congo was
stoned by an angry mob that reportedly had been organized by local
authorities (interview, NGO official, South Kivu, spring 2005). After that
incident, a few Banyamulenges trickled back into South Kivu, but many
stayed in Burundi for over a year, afraid to go back. 
Interaction between Local, National, and Regional
Motivations: Understanding the Joint Production of Violence
During the transition, then, just as during the war, local violence was moti-
vated not only by top-down causes (regional or national) but also by bot-
tom-up agendas.17 This section illuminates the interaction among
regional, national, and local dimensions of violence in two provinces:
North Kivu, where national and regional master cleavages apparently
caused most of the conflict, and South Kivu, where local agendas were
more influential than national and regional issues in generating conflict.18
North Kivu: Master Cleavages and Local Alliances
During the transition, North Kivu (see Figure 1) was marred by the com-
bination of tensions among its eight ethnic communities—mostly caused
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by land and citizenship issues—and by conflicts between the five armed
groups present in the province (RCD-G, RCD-K/ML and government
forces, FDLR, Mai Mai, and local defense forces). Most sources have char-
acterized the violence in terms of the master ethnic cleavage (Rwando-
phones versus other ethnic communities) neatly superimposed, and run-
ning along the same dividing line, as the political cleavage (Kabila versus
RCD-G). 
After large-scale fighting took place around Bukavu in June 2004 and
the RCD-G lost control of the South Kivu province, and while the political
struggle between Kabila and the RCD-G continued unabated throughout
the whole Congo (in particular in Kinshasa), the military conflict between
these two enemies continued in one last place: North Kivu. The “Petit
Nord” (the southern part of North Kivu, behind the former RCD-K/ML
front line) remained the last stronghold of the RCD-G. The former rebel
movement maintained absolute control there. In violation of one of the
rules of the transition, both the governor (Eugene Seruphuli) and the
regional military commanders (first General Obedie, then General Amisi)
were RCD-G officials. Up until 2006, FARDC rank and file were not enlisted
from each component but instead were exclusively former RCD-G soldiers.
They were supported by the three-thousand-strong Local Defense Forces, a
predominantly Hutu militia that North Kivu Governor Seruphuli created
during the war and that Rwandan forces trained. North Kivu still had its
own “financial coordinator” (a sort of finance minister). Its tax services still
reported to Goma and not to their theoretical superiors in Kinshasa. Its
revenues remained in the province instead of going to the capital. In addi-
tion, pro-RCD-G communities continued to hold the economic and social
power of the province. As a result, from the Bukavu crisis onward, national
politicians—except for those belonging to the RCD-G—thought of North
Kivu as the exception: the province least integrated into the transition
process and the last holdout, the place Kabila needed to take control of in
order to unify the rest of the country. The regional dimension was also pre-
sent—although less so than during the wars. Rwanda reportedly supported
the RCD-G with its financial, military, and political might, and engaged in
fighting against the Nandes, Mai Mai, and FDLR alongside RCD-G troops
(author’s interviews, 2004–5; author’s review of press articles 2003–6;
Global Witness 2005:26).
The Kabila government’s strength in its struggle against the RCD-G in
North Kivu came in large part from the allies it had there: the RCD-K/ML,
which kept the RCD-G busy on the northern front (along the same front
line as during the war); and the Mai Mai, which fought against the RCD-G
from within its area of control. During the transition, both of these allies
were anti-RCD-G for provincial and local reasons rather than because of
any convictions about the master conflict between Kabila and the RCD-G.
Indeed, since colonization, North Kivu had progressively seen a strong
polarization between its two most populous ethnic groups, the Banyarwan-
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das and the Nandes, over the control of the province (Willame 1997). Dur-
ing the war, the elites of these competing ethnic groups each controlled
half of the province and allied themselves with different warring parties—
the RCD-K/ML and Kabila for the Nandes, the RCD-G for the Banyarwan-
das. During the first months of the transition, the antagonism had reached
such a point that the Banyarwandas and Nandes suspected each other of
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Figure 1. Map of North Kivu
harboring plans to eradicate the other (Bushoki 2005; MONUC 2004). In
May 2004, the province was finally reunified administratively and put under
the leadership of Eugene Seruphuli. However, this did not assuage the ten-
sions between Banyarwandas and Nandes. On the contrary, members of
non-Rwandophone ethnic groups living in Goma complained that the
RCD-G’s rule had a strong ethnic flavor, and it continued to be associated
with Banyarwanda domination (Tanzi 2005). The “indigenous” ethnic
groups deplored the fact that Rwandophones, as during the war, continued
to occupy all political, military, and business positions of authority in the
province. RCD-G soldiers continued to provide day-to-day protection to
Banyarwanda groups in North Kivu, and RCD-G politicians continued to
advocate for their cause nationally. As a result, up until the end of the tran-
sition, Nande Mai Mai groups remained extremely active in the “Grand
Nord” for fear of a potential Banyarwanda invasion from the south. Despite
administrative reunification, the front line between RCD-G and RCD-
K/ML forces (allied with Rwanda’s and Kabila’s troops, respectively)
remained active. Numerous skirmishes took place there in 2004, 2005, and
2006, and they erupted in a large-scale confrontation around Kanyabay-
onga in December 2004. 
In addition, Kabila could also count on local tensions between “indige-
nous” and Rwandophone communities to recruit local allies, both political
(as in the Civil Society party) and military (as in the Mai Mai militias) to
fight against the RCD-G. For example, in Masisi and Rutchuru, Civil Soci-
ety representatives and local militias had two reasons for fighting against
anything perceived as part of a Rwandophone movement (MONUC 2004).
First, the Hundes and the Nyangas felt that they were the only communi-
ties with a rightful claim on traditional (and political) representation.
Although the Hutus were the majority population of the Masisi territory
and demanded the right to adequate representation at the political and
traditional levels, the Hundes and Nyangas saw them as “immigrants” who
had arrived during the colonization or after independence and therefore
had no legal claim on traditional power. As explored above, this led to
major tensions regarding who could be named chief of a village or a col-
lectivity, such as in the Osso and Bashili collectivities. 
Second, Rwandophones (mostly Tutsis) owned about 80 percent of the
land as a result of transactions they had made under Mobutu. However, the
Hundes and the Nyangas claimed that the land was traditionally theirs:
Mobutu should not have been allowed to sell it because it belonged to tra-
ditional authorities. The issue of land ownership was further complicated
by the fact that many Tutsis had fled Masisi in the 1990s to escape the ongo-
ing massacres, and either had abandoned their land or sold it at an artifi-
cially low price. When they came back after the 1996 and 1998 wars, they
found their lands occupied and reportedly took all of it back, by force if
necessary, including the land that had been sold legitimately (Tanzi 2005). 
These local antagonisms over political and economic issues were car-
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ried onto the military stage, particularly the conflict between the Mai Mai
(allied with FDLR) and both the Local Defense Forces and the RCD-G. The
Mai Mai represented the “indigenous” communities, whereas the RCD-G
and Local Defense Forces were accused of siding with the Hutus and the
Tutsis (Tanzi 2005). Fighting became more frequent and more violent after
the 2004 Bukavu crisis, which generated a complete breakdown of trust
between the RCD-G and the Mai Mai. In October 2004, the situation in
Masisi became so tense that there was once again a real front line within
the province, with both groups committing abuses against people crossing
to the other side. 
Local agendas regarding traditional power or land, which led to hos-
tilities at the provincial (Nandes versus Rwandophones) and village (Hutus
or Tutsis versus other communities) levels, were therefore as influential as
national and regional cleavages in generating violence. However, local con-
flicts were easily reinterpreted in light of the ethnic and political cleavages,
and thus North Kivu politics appeared to be dominated by these master
cleavages. In contrast, in South Kivu, after the Bukavu crisis, the master
cleavages carried much less weight and the local agendas could hardly be
interpreted in light of them. 
South Kivu: Local Agendas and National Involvement 
Up until the Bukavu crisis, the dynamics in South Kivu were similar to those
in North Kivu, apparently articulated around the RCD-G versus Kabila
political cleavage and the Banyamulenge versus other communities ethnic
cleavage. The Bukavu crisis marked the disappearance of both master nar-
ratives from South Kivu politics. RCD-G troops were utterly defeated—most
of them retreated to North Kivu or Rwanda and a few were integrated
within the FARDC—and RCD-G authorities lost administrative control of
the province. The Rwandophone population fled to North Kivu, Burundi,
or to the Banyamulenge rural stronghold in the high plateaus, and only the
tensions around their potential return remained. And yet the disappear-
ance of the political and ethnic cleavages resulted in a South Kivu that was
far from pacified. In 2005, for example, the 200-kilometer road from
Kamanyola (beginning on the Ruzizi plain, at the border with Rwanda—
see Figure 2) to Fizzi crossed over the territory of twelve different armed
groups and bordered the territory of four other militias, some of which
were allied with foreign rebel groups. All these soldiers continued to com-
mit abuses against the Congolese population, while the presence of RCD-G,
Mai Mai, Banyamulenge, and FDLR armed groups transformed the
province into a powder keg.
The reason that South Kivu continued to be fragmented despite the
quasi-disappearance of the national and regional sources of violence was
that many local conflicts remained unresolved. Antagonisms revolved
around the leadership of specific militias (as between General Dunia and
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Colonel Nguvu); disagreement over who could control the political and
economic resources won by the group; opposing claims on land, mining
sites, and traditional and administrative positions; ethnic tensions (Bembes
versus Banyamulenges and Buyus, Tembos versus Shis, Fuleros/Baviras ver-
sus Banyamulenges, Shis versus Regas); and clan tensions (among the
three main Shi subgroups, among Bembe clans, among Banyamulenge
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Figure 2. Map of South Kivu
clans). As a result, Mai Mai militias continued their armed struggle despite
the fact that, by the summer of 2004, almost all of them had been officially
integrated into the FARDC.
The Mai Mai continued to ally itself with national and regional actors,
but to a much lesser extent than in the past. Many Mai Mai militias contin-
ued to rely on regional rebel armed groups. This partnership remained
mutually beneficial: it provided the Mai Mai with additional fighters while
it gave foreign armed groups the local support they needed to stay on Con-
golese territory. However, one of the master cleavages, the regional con-
frontation, had lost most of the weight it had carried during the war. Now
that foreign armies had mostly withdrawn, Rwandan and Burundian rebel
groups did not need to use violence to fight back the Rwandan or Burun-
dian state armies. On the contrary, as shown above, foreign militias used
violence to assert their control over land and mining sites or to secure the
money and goods they needed to survive.
Most Mai Mai militias stationed in the Kivus also abandoned their pre-
vious alliance with Kabila: after the Bukavu crisis, siding with Kabila would
not have enabled them to further their local interests.19 Indeed Kabila
needed to extend the Transitional Government’s authority in the province,
which involved imposing legitimate state and traditional authorities (often
non-Mai Mai chiefs), providing security (notably by imposing strict control
over all armed groups), and ending the conditions of impunity under
which the Mai Mai’s power had operated. In 2005, the rupture between the
Mai Mai and Kabila became increasingly clear. Mai Mai administrative
authorities often refused to obey government instructions that clashed with
their own interests. Similarly, many Mai Mai officers refused to obey their
superiors in the tenth military region, in particular General Mbuza Mabe.
This rupture led to fighting between different factions of the FARDC (i.e.,
Mai Mai versus government-affiliated factions), such as in Kabare in late
January 2005. This conflict abated in 2006, but it seemed more a pause in
the trend of mounting tensions than a real settlement: conflicts were
frozen until the upcoming local and national elections, with most groups
waiting to see if their claims could be satisfied peacefully or if they had to
resume fighting.
There was no Mai Mai hierarchy controlling any of these militias,
either nationally or even within one city. For example, in Uvira, there was
no unitary command controlling the five different armed groups present
after June 2004 (interview, Congolese peace builder, Uvira, spring 2005).
Throughout South Kivu, each militia was further divided into subgroups
and subfactions to such a point that many brigade commanders could not
seem to control their battalion commanders (Dupin 2005). Mai Mai mili-
tias were thus micro-local armed groups that withheld enduring allegiance
to national or regional actors. 
Thus, since the Bukavu crisis, local agendas have seemed to be the
determining factors generating violence in South Kivu. It is true that prob-
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lems caused by the return of the Banyamulenges and the continued FDLR
presence in the east could be interpreted with reference to national or
regional cleavages. However, both issues have very strong local dimensions.
In addition, the major source of tension in 2004 and 2005 was linked to the
insubordination of Mai Mai militias (which, in turn, determined their
alliance with FDLR forces), and this insubordination stemmed from purely
local causes. 
Conclusion
My analysis suggests that peace builders involved in the Congolese transi-
tion should have addressed local violence for two main reasins. First, the
humanitarian cost of local antagonisms that turned violent was staggering.
Second, the neglect of local issues could lead only to incomplete and
unsustainable peace settlements. Local manifestations of violence,
although often related to national or regional struggles, were also precipi-
tated by distinctively local problems. These included conflict over land,
mineral resources, traditional power, local taxes, and the relative social sta-
tus of specific groups and individuals. Even issues usually presented as
regional questions (such as the FDLR problem) or national ones (such as
ethnic tensions with Congolese Rwandophones) had significant local com-
ponents, which fueled and reinforced the regional and national dimen-
sions. 
Local, national, and regional dimensions of violence remained closely
interlinked in most of the eastern Congo. Local agendas provided national
and regional actors with local allies, who were crucial in maintaining mili-
tary control, continuing resource exploitation, and persecuting political or
ethnic enemies. Local tensions could also jeopardize the national and
regional reconciliation: for example, by motivating violence against the
Rwandophone minority or allowing a strong FDLR presence in the Kivus.
In addition, during the transition, some local conflicts became
autonomous from the national and regional tracks, most notably in South
Kivu and North Katanga. There local disputes over political power, eco-
nomic resources (especially land and mining sites), and social status led to
clashes that no national or regional actors could stop.
However, in combination with contextual and material constraints and
with the major powers’ lack of national interest in the Congo, the framing
processes by which international peace builders understood the violence
and the peace process resulted in a puzzling inattention to local violence
(Autesserre 2006). Diplomats, U.N. staff, and some nongovernmental orga-
nizations focused their efforts on organizing national elections rather than
on building peace at the local level. They portrayed local violence as a
humanitarian problem and not as a political one, and each one assumed
that the responsibility for working on local-level violence belonged to
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someone else. The few organizations working at the local level focused on
the Ituri district at the expense of other troubled areas. In the Kivus and
North Katanga provinces they responded only to issues concerning the
Rwandophone minority and virtually ignored the other causes of local vio-
lence. 
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Notes
1. “Rwandophone” means Kinyarwanda-speaking people. In the Congolese con-
text, the term is used to refer to Congolese of Rwandan ancestry (both Hutus
and Tutsis). Although many of them descend from families who arrived during
the colonization period or shortly after independence (1960), their Congolese
citizenship has been hotly contested for the past fifty years. These ethnic ten-
sions have led to local ethnic massacres (Masisi 1993), and they were one of the
reasons for the 1998 war. Within the Rwandophone population, I further dif-
ferentiate between Banyarwanda (Rwandophones from the North Kivu
province) and Banyamulenge (Rwandophones from the South Kivu province). 
“Indigenous” is the term used by ethnic groups that are native to the east-
ern Congo to refer to themselves. It aims at differentiating them from ethnic
groups considered to be foreign, in particular the Rwandophones.
2. For an analysis of local conflict before and during the war, see Autesserre
(2006, chapters 1 and 2); International Crisis Group (2003); Mamdani (2001);
Van Acker and Vlassenroot (2000); Van Hoyweghen and Vlassenroot (2000);
Vlassenroot (2000); and Willame (1997).
3. The FDLR is a Rwandan rebel group composed mostly of ethnic Hutus based
in the eastern Congo. In this article, I use “FDLR” to refer to all Hutu refugees
based in the eastern Congo, including the few not associated with the FDLR
movement.
4. This paragraph is based on anonymous interviews with foreign diplomats and
U.N. officials conducted in Kinshasa and in the Kivus between 2001 and 2006.
The quotations are excerpted from an interview with a U.N. official conducted
in 2005.
5. The RCD-G was the main rebel group during the 1998 war, controlling most of
the eastern Congo. It was transformed into a political party during the transi-
tion.
6. Cited in “Illicit Gold Finances Weapons,” News24.com, April 8, 2005.
7. The tensions between the RCD-G and Kabila erupted in widely publicized
fighting during the Bukavu and Kanyabayonga crisis (2004), which in turn
reinforced the distrust among the different groups. These tensions also
resulted in many small-scale fights between 2003 and 2006, including, for
example: RCD-G against Mai Mai in Masisi, Kitene, Baraka, Kanyabayonga;
RCD-G against Mai Mai and FDLR coalitions in Masisi, Rutchuru, Walungu,
Bunyakiri, Bweremana, and Shabunda; and Banyamulenges against Mai Mai in
Baraka. See the maps of North and South Kivu below.
8. The Mai Mai is composed of local militias formed on the basis of ethnicity
throughout the eastern Congo. It is officially considered a national actor (the
Mai Mai “movement” sent ministers, deputies, and senators to the transition
institutions), but Mai Mai groups have never been unified under a single com-
mand structure. During the war, the only common points between the differ-
ent militias were their reliance on magic-based ritual and their pretense of
being born out of a need to defend their villages. During the transition, the
Mai Mai “movement” remained a loose network of very different militias fol-
lowing various—and often competing—leaders.
9. The Corruption Perceptions Index published by the independent watchdog
Transparency International in 2004 ranked the Democratic Republic of Congo
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133 out of 146 countries and gave it a score of 2.0 (0 being highly corrupt and
10 highly clean). 
10. See Autesserre (2006, chapter 2), Van Acker and Vlassenroot (2000), and
Vlassenroot (2000) for an account of the changes to the power structure of the
Congolese society during the war.
11. “Forgotten War Rumbles On in South Congo Province,” Reuters, September
14, 2005.
12. See Mamdani (2001), Vlassenroot (2000), and Willame (1997) for an analysis
of the land issue before and during the war.
13. Field observations and author’s interviews, 2004–6. Quotation from Rony Brau-
man, director of research at the Médecins Sans Frontières Foundation, at the
launch of the MSF film “Congo, Peace Held Hostage,” reported in “Violence
Ignored in Congo’s Katanga–MSF,” Reuters, July 24, 2005.
14. For example, the journalist Ghislaine Dupont reported that in South Kivu,
“upon being attacked, the FDLR retreat into the forest, and then return to
their zones where they continue to exploit gold and cassiterite mines, acting in
collusion with some Congolese officials, such as local territory administrators,
who also profit from this business” (Radio France International, August 12,
2005). Many interviews and informal communications also confirmed the exis-
tence of collusion between FDLR and local authorities in this province.
15. During the transition, the FDLR continued to control many mineral areas of
the Kivus, often in collaboration with Mai Mai groups (Global Witness 2005:4,
20; MONUC 2004; U.N. Security Council 2005d: par. 39; and author’s inter-
views 2004–6). 
16. The incentive to stay in the Congo was all the stronger because the dictatorial
nature of the Kigali regime and its harsh treatment of political opponents gave
Rwandan Hutu refugees in the Congo little hope for livable conditions in
Rwanda. It was further reinforced by the harsh discipline implemented by
FDLR top commanders, who would lose the basis of their power if FDLR com-
batants and civilians left the Congo; many leaders intimidated and sometimes
killed the potential deserters they had identified in their ranks (author’s inter-
views with Congolese and expatriates working with the FDLR, 2004–6; Synergie
Vie 2004).
17. Unless otherwise indicated, this section is a synthesis of field observations in
the Kivus (2004–6), anonymous interviews with Congolese and international
observers (2004–6), and author’s review of press articles.
18. An analysis of the interacting dynamics of violence in Katanga would show pat-
terns very similar to those identified in South Kivu, the main difference being
that local cleavages were even further disconnected from national ones
(Autesserre 2006, conclusion to part 1).
19. The official reason for the falling out was that the Mai Mai were angry at not
receiving the same treatment as the trained forces (Global Witness 2005:20).
